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Abstract:  The Basel II Accord requires that banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking 
Institutions (ADIs) communicate their daily risk forecasts to the appropriate monetary 
authorities at the beginning of each trading day, using one or more risk models to measure 
Value-at-Risk (VaR). The risk estimates of these models are used to determine capital 
requirements and associated capital costs of ADIs, depending in part on the number of 
previous violations, whereby realised losses exceed the estimated VaR. In this paper we 
define risk management in terms of choosing from a variety of risk models, and discuss the 
selection of optimal risk models. A new approach to model selection for predicting VaR is 
proposed, consisting of combining alternative risk models, and we compare conservative and 
aggressive strategies for choosing between VaR models. We then examine how different risk 
management strategies performed during the 2008-09 global financial crisis. These issues are 
illustrated using Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite Index. 
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Has the Basel Accord Improved Risk Management During 
the Global Financial Crisis?* 
 
1. Introduction. 
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 has left an indelible mark on economic and financial 
structures worldwide, and left an entire generation of investors wondering how things could 
have become so severe (see, for example, Borio (2008)). There have been many questions 
asked about whether appropriate regulations were in place, especially in the US, to permit the 
appropriate monitoring and encouragement of (possibly excessive) risk taking.  
The Basel II Accord was designed to monitor and encourage sensible risk taking using 
appropriate models of risk to calculate Value-at-Risk (VaR) and forecast daily capital 
charges. VaR is defined as an estimate of the probability and size of the potential loss to be 
expected over a given period, and is now a standard tool in risk management. It has become 
especially important following the 1995 amendment to the Basel Accord, whereby banks and 
other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) were permitted (and encouraged) to use 
internal models to forecast daily VaR (see Jorion (2000) for a detailed discussion). The last 
decade has witnessed a growing academic and professional literature comparing alternative 
modelling approaches to determine how to measure VaR, especially for large portfolios of 
financial assets.  
When the Basel I Accord was concluded in 1988, no capital requirements were defined for 
market risk. However, regulators soon recognized the risks to a banking system if insufficient 
capital is held to absorb the large sudden losses from huge exposures in capital markets. 
During the mid 90’s, proposals were tabled for an amendment to the 1988 Accord, requiring 
additional capital over and above the minimum required for credit risk. Finally, a market risk 
capital adequacy framework was adopted in 1995 for implementation in 1998. The 1995 
Basel I Accord amendment provides a menu of approaches for determining market risk 
capital requirements, ranging from a simple, to intermediate and advanced approaches. Under 
the advanced approach (the internal model approach), banks are allowed to calculate the 
capital requirement for market risk using their internal models. The use of internal models 
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was only introduced in 1998 in the European Union. The 26 June 2004 Basel II framework, 
implemented in many countries in 2008 (though not yet formally in the USA) enhanced the 
requirements for market risk management by including, for example, oversight rules, 
disclosure, management of counterparty risk in trading portfolios. 
In the 1995 amendment, p. 16, a similar capital requirement system was recommended, but 
the specific penalties were left to each national supervisor. We consider that the penalty 
structure contained in Table 1 of this paper belongs only to Basel II, and was not part of 
Basel I or its 1995 amendment. 
The amendment to the initial Basel Accord was designed to encourage and reward 
institutions with superior risk management systems. A back-testing procedure, whereby 
actual returns are compared with the corresponding VaR forecasts, was introduced to assess 
the quality of the internal models used by ADIs. In cases where internal models lead to a 
greater number of violations than could reasonably be expected, given the confidence level, 
the ADI is required to hold a higher level of capital (see Table 1 for the penalties imposed 
under the Basel II Accord. Penalties imposed on ADIs affect profitability directly through 
higher capital charges, and indirectly through the imposition of a more stringent external 
model to forecast VaR
1
. This is one reason why financial managers may prefer risk 
management strategies that are passive and conservative rather than active and aggressive. 
Excessive conservatism can have a negative impact on the profitability of ADIs as higher 
capital charges are subsequently required. Therefore, ADIs should perhaps consider a 
strategy that allows an endogenous decision as to how many times ADIs should violate in any 
financial year (for further details, see McAleer and da Veiga (2008a, 2008b), McAleer 
(2008), Caporin and McAleer (2010) and McAleer et al. (2010)).  
However, in this paper we adopt a different approach based on an alternative design of 
optimal strategies. Since ADIs typically want to maximize their profit within the rules of 
Basel II, choosing the forecasting model of VaR that minimizes daily capital charges while 
keeping the number of violations within the limits of Table 1, is required. 
                                                 
1 In the 1995 amendment (page 16), a similar capital requirement system was recommended, but specific 
penalties were left to each national supervisor. We interpret the penalty structure contained in Table 1 of this 
paper as belonging only to Basel II, and not as part of Basel I or its 1995 amendment. 
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We observe that the risk model that minimizes daily capital charges has changed before, 
during and after the global financial crisis. Since no single model is optimal over time, we 
have devised as an alternative to single models, using combinations of them. Combining 
forecasting models is common in the time series literature but it has been rarely used for 
forecasting VaR for risk management purposes (Chiriac and Pohlmeier, 2010, which was 
released after the first version of this paper, propose to combine models but their benchmark 
criteria for model comparison is different). 
This paper considers market
2
 risk management in terms of choosing sensibly and optimally 
from a variety of risk models. The main contribution of this paper is to propose combining 
alternative models of market risk for purposes of risk management in the context of Basel II. 
We also propose some examples of combinations of strategies, such as conservative and 
aggressive strategies, and discuss how to choose between them.  
From a practical perspective, the paper also examines how the new market risk management 
strategies performed during the 2008-09 global financial crisis and beyond. The paper then 
forecasts VaR and daily capital charges for the different market risk management strategies 
considered. These issues are illustrated using Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite Index.  
The Basel II accord has been in operation in Europe only from 2008. The effects of the global 
financial crisis should probably not be attributed to any failings of Basel II as it was not 
implemented in the USA, which was the epicentre of the crisis (see, for example, Cannata 
and Quagliariello (2009)).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the main ideas of 
the Basel II Accord Amendment as it relates to forecasting VaR and daily capital charges. 
Section 3 reviews some of the most well known models of volatility that are used to forecast 
VaR and calculate daily capital charges, and presents aggressive and conservative bounds on 
risk management strategies. In Section 4 the data used for estimation and forecasting are 
presented. Section 5 analyses the forecast values of VaR and daily capital charges before, 
during and after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, and Section 6 summarizes the main 
conclusions. 
                                                 
2. Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in the on and off-balance sheet positions arising from movements 
in market prices. The risks subject to this requirement pertain to interest rate related instruments and equities 
in the trading book, and foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (2006)). 
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2. Forecasting Value-at-Risk and Daily Capital Charges. 
The Basel II Accord stipulates that daily capital charges, (DCC) must be set at the higher of 
the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over the last 60 business days, multiplied by a 
factor (3+k) for a violation penalty, wherein a violation involves the actual negative returns 
exceeding the VaR forecast negative returns for a given day:
3
 
  
   
______
60t t-1= sup - 3+ k VaR ,  - VaRDCC  (1) 
 
where  
 
DCCt = daily capital charges, which is the higher of   60
______
t-1- 3+ k VaR  and  - VaR , 
 
tVaR  = Value-at-Risk for day t, 
 
tttt zYVaR ˆ
ˆ  , 
 
60
______
VaR  = mean VaR over the previous 60 working days, 
 
tYˆ = estimated return at time t, 
 
tz = 1% critical value of the distribution of returns at time t,  
 
tˆ = estimated risk (or square root of volatility) at time t, 
 
0 k 1    is the Basel II violation penalty (see Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 goes here] 
 
The multiplication factor
4
 (or penalty), k, depends on the central authority’s assessment of the 
ADI’s risk management practices and the results of a simple back test. It is determined by the 
number of times actual losses exceed a particular day’s VaR forecast (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (1996, 2006)). The minimum multiplication factor of 3 is intended to 
compensate for various errors that can arise in model implementation, such as simplifying 
assumptions, analytical approximations, small sample biases and numerical errors that tend to 
                                                 
3
 Our aim is to investigate the likely performance of the Basel II regulations. In this section we carry out our 
analysis applying the Basel II formulae to a period that includes the 2008-09 global financial crisis, during 
which the Basel II Accord regulations were not fully implemented. 
4
 Formula (1) is contained in the 1995 amendment to Basel I, while Table 1 appears for the first time in the 
Basel II Accord in 2004.  
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reduce the true risk coverage of the model (see Stahl (1997)). Increases in the multiplication 
factor are designed to increase the confidence level that is implied by the observed number of 
violations to the 99 per cent confidence level, as required by the regulators (for a detailed 
discussion of VaR, as well as exogenous and endogenous violations, see McAleer (2009), 
Jiménez-Martin et al. (2009), and McAleer et al. (2010)). 
In calculating the number of violations, ADIs are required to compare the forecasts of VaR 
with realised profit and loss figures for the previous 250 trading days. In 1995, the 1988 
Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988) was amended to allow ADIs 
to use internal models to determine their VaR thresholds (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (1995)). However, ADIs that proposed using internal models are required to 
demonstrate that their models are sound. Movement from the green zone to the red zone 
arises through an excessive number of violations. Although this will lead to a higher value of 
k, and hence a higher penalty, a violation will also tend to be associated with lower daily 
capital charges.
5
 
Value-at-Risk refers to the lower bound of a confidence interval for a (conditional) mean, that 
is, a “worst case scenario on a typical day”. If interest lies in modelling the random variable, 
 
Y
t
, it could be decomposed as follows: 
 
 1( | )t t t tY E Y F   . (2) 
 
This decomposition states that 
 
Y
t
 comprises a predictable component,
 
E(Y
t
| F
t1
) , which is 
the conditional mean, and a random component, 
 

t
. The variability of 
 
Y
t
, and hence its 
distribution, is determined by the variability of 
 

t
. If it is assumed that 
 

t
 follows a 
conditional distribution such that: 
 
),(~ 2ttt D                                                         
 
where
 

t
 and 
 

t
 are the conditional mean and standard deviation of 
 

t
, respectively, these 
can be estimated using a variety of parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric methods. 
The VaR threshold for 
 
Y
t
 can be calculated as: 
                                                 
5
 The number of violations in a given period is an important guidance (but not the only one) for the regulators to 
approve a given VaR model. 
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 1( | )t t t tVaR E Y F   , (3) 
 
where  is the critical value from the distribution of 
 

t
 to obtain the appropriate confidence 
level. It is possible for 
 

t
 to be replaced by alternative estimates of the conditional standard 
deviation in order to obtain an appropriate VaR (for useful reviews of theoretical results for 
conditional volatility models, see Li et al. (2002) and McAleer (2005), who discusses a 
variety of univariate and multivariate, conditional, stochastic and realized volatility models).  
Some empirical studies (see, for example, Berkowitz and O'Brien (2001), Gizycki and 
Hereford (1998), and Pérignon et al. (2008)) have indicated that some financial institutions 
overestimate their market risks in disclosures to the appropriate regulatory authorities, which 
can imply a costly restriction to the banks trading activity. ADIs may prefer to report high 
VaR numbers to avoid the possibility of regulatory intrusion. This conservative risk reporting 
suggests that efficiency gains may be feasible. In particular, as ADIs have effective tools for 
the measurement of market risk, while satisfying the qualitative requirements, ADIs could 
conceivably reduce daily capital charges by implementing a context-dependent market risk 
disclosure policy. For a discussion of alternative approaches to optimize VaR and daily 
capital charges, see McAleer (2009) and McAleer et al. (2010). 
The next section describes several volatility models that are widely used to forecast the 1-day 
ahead conditional variances and VaR thresholds.  
 
 
3. Models for Forecasting VaR. 
As discussed previously, ADIs can use internal models to determine their VaR thresholds. 
There are alternative time series models for estimating conditional volatility. In what follows, 
we present several conditional volatility models to evaluate strategic market risk disclosure, 
namely GARCH, GJR and EGARCH, with Gaussian, Student t, and Generalized Gaussian 
distributions errors, where the degrees of freedom are estimated.  
These models were chosen because they are well known and are widely used in the literature. 
For an extensive discussion of the theoretical properties of several of these models, see Ling 
and McAleer (2002a, 2002b, 2003a) and Caporin and McAleer (2010). As an alternative to 
estimating the parameters, we also consider the exponential weighted moving average 
(EWMA) method by Riskmetrics
TM 
(1996) and Zumbach, (2007) that calibrates the unknown 
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parameters. We include a section on these models to present them in a unified framework and 
notation, and to make explicit the specific versions we are using. Apart from EWMA, the 
models are presented in increasing order of complexity. 
 
 
3.1.  GARCH. 
For a wide range of financial data series, time-varying conditional variances can be explained 
empirically through the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model, which 
was proposed by Engle (1982). When the time-varying conditional variance has both 
autoregressive and moving average components, this leads to the generalized ARCH(p,q), or 
GARCH(p,q), model of Bollerslev (1986). It is very common to impose the widely estimated 
GARCH(1,1) specification in advance.  
Consider the stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model for daily returns, ty :   
 
 t 1 2 t-1 t 2y =φ +φ y +ε , φ <1  (4) 
 
for nt ,...,1 , where the shocks to returns are given by:  
 
 
t t t t
2
t t-1 t-1
ε = η h , η ~ iid(0,1)
h = ω+αε + βh ,
 (5) 
 
and 0, 0, 0      are sufficient conditions to ensure that the conditional variance 0th . 
The stationary AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model can be modified to incorporate a non-stationary 
ARMA(p,q) conditional mean and a stationary GARCH(r,s) conditional variance, as in Ling 
and McAleer (2003b). 
 
3.2.  GJR. 
In the symmetric GARCH model, the effects of positive shocks (or upward movements in 
daily returns) on the conditional variance, th , are assumed to be the same as the negative 
shocks (or downward movements in daily returns). In order to accommodate asymmetric 
behaviour, Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1992) proposed a model (hereafter GJR), for 
which GJR(1,1) is defined as follows:  
 
 
2
t t-1 t-1 t-1h =ω+(α+γI(η ))ε + βh ,  (6) 
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where 0,0,0,0    are sufficient conditions for ,0th  and )( tI   is an 
indicator variable defined by: 
 
  
1, 0
0, 0
t
t
t
I




 

 (7) 
 
 as t  has the same sign as t . The indicator variable differentiates between positive and 
negative shocks, so that asymmetric effects in the data are captured by the coefficient  . For 
financial data, it is expected that 0  because negative shocks have a greater impact on 
risk than do positive shocks of similar magnitude. The asymmetric effect, ,  measures the 
contribution of shocks to both short run persistence, 2  , and to long run persistence, 
2    . Although GJR permits asymmetric effects of positive and negative shocks of 
equal magnitude on conditional volatility, the special case of leverage, whereby negative 
shocks increase volatility while positive shocks decrease volatility (see Black (1976) for an 
argument using the debt/equity ratio), cannot be accommodated, at least in practice. 
 
 
3.3.  EGARCH. 
An alternative model to capture asymmetric behaviour in the conditional variance is the 
Exponential GARCH, or EGARCH(1,1), model of Nelson (1991), namely:  
 
 t-1 t-1t t-1
t-1 t-1
ε ε
logh = ω+α +γ + βlogh , | β |<1
h h
 (8) 
 
where the parameters ,    and   have different interpretations from those in the 
GARCH(1,1) and GJR(1,1) models.  
EGARCH captures asymmetries differently from GJR. The parameters   and   in 
EGARCH(1,1) represent the magnitude (or size) and sign effects of the standardized 
residuals, respectively, on the conditional variance, whereas   and    represent the 
effects of positive and negative shocks, respectively, on the conditional variance in GJR(1,1). 
Unlike GJR, EGARCH can accommodate leverage, depending on two sets of restrictions 
imposed on the size and sign parameters. 
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As noted in McAleer et al. (2007), there are some important differences between EGARCH 
and the previous two models, as follows: (i) EGARCH is a model of the logarithm of the 
conditional variance, which implies that no restrictions on the parameters are required to 
ensure 0th ; (ii) moment conditions are required for the GARCH and GJR models as they 
are dependent on lagged unconditional shocks, whereas EGARCH does not require moment 
conditions to be established as it depends on lagged conditional shocks (or standardized 
residuals); (iii) Shephard (1996) observed that 1||   is likely to be a sufficient condition 
for consistency of QMLE for EGARCH(1,1); (iv) as the standardized residuals appear in 
equation (7), 1||   would seem to be a sufficient condition for the existence of moments; 
and (v) in addition to being a sufficient condition for consistency, 1||   is also likely to be 
sufficient for asymptotic normality of the QMLE of EGARCH(1,1). 
The three conditional volatility models given above are estimated under the following 
distributional assumptions on the conditional shocks: (1) normal, and (2)  Student t, with 
estimated degrees of freedom. As the models that incorporate the t distributed errors are 
estimated by QMLE, the resulting estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal, so 
they can be used for estimation, inference and forecasting. 
 
3.4.  Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA). 
As an alternative to estimating the parameters of the appropriate conditional volatility 
models, Riskmetrics
TM 
(1996) developed a model which estimates the conditional variances 
and covariances based on the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) method, 
which is, in effect, a restricted version of the ARCH( ) model. This approach forecasts the 
conditional variance at time t as a linear combination of the lagged conditional variance and 
the squared unconditional shock at time 1t  . The EWMA model calibrates the conditional 
variance as: 
  
 
2
t t-1 t-1h = λh +(1- λ)ε     (9) 
 
where   is a decay parameter. Riskmetrics™ (1996) suggests that   should be set at 0.94 for 
purposes of analysing daily data. As no parameters are estimated, there is no need to establish 
any moment or log-moment conditions for purposes of demonstrating the statistical 
properties of the estimators. 
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4. Data. 
The data used for estimation and forecasting are the closing daily prices for S&P’s Composite 
500 Composite Index (S&P500), which were obtained from the Ecowin Financial Database 
for the period 3 January 2000 to 8 August 2012. Although it is unlikely that an ADI’s typical 
market risk portfolio tracks only the S&P500 Composite Index, which is not a traded index 
(unlike its options or futures counterparts), the S&P Composite Index is used as an 
illustration of the broad movements of profits and losses of the equity portfolios of ADIs.  
If tP  denotes the market price, the returns at time t ( )tR  are defined as: 
 
  1log / t t tR P P . (10) 
 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the S&P500 returns, for which the descriptive statistics are given in Table 2. 
The extremely high positive and negative returns are evident from September 2008 onward, 
and have continued well into 2009 and during the European sovereign-debt crisis, which 
started in May 2010. The mean is close to zero, and the range is between +11% and -9.5%. 
The Jarque-Bera Lagrange multiplier test rejects the null hypothesis of normally distributed 
returns. As the series displays high kurtosis, this would seem to indicate the existence of 
extreme observations, as can be seen in the histogram, which is not surprising for financial 
returns data. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Several measures of volatility are available in the literature. In order to gain some intuition, 
we adopt the measure proposed in Franses and van Dijk (1999), where the true volatility of 
returns is defined as: 
 
   
2
1|  t t t tV R E R F , (11) 
 
where 1tF  is the information set at time t-1.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2 shows the S&P500 volatility, as the square root of Vt in equation (11). The series 
exhibits clustering that needs to be captured by an appropriate time series model. The 
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volatility of the series appears to be high during the early 2000s, followed by a quiet period 
from 2003 to the beginning of 2007. Volatility increases dramatically after August 2008, due 
in large part to the worsening global credit environment. This increase in volatility is even 
higher in October 2008. In less than 4 weeks in October 2008, the S&P500 index plummeted 
by 27.1%. In less than 3 weeks in November 2008, starting the morning after the US 
elections, the S&P500 index  plunged a further 25.2%. Overall, from late August 2008, US 
stocks fell by an almost unbelievable 42.2% to reach a low on 20 November 2008.  
Since the end of 2008, there have been further significant shocks, especially those initiated by 
the European sovereign debt crisis, which started in May 2010. However, these shocks have 
not been as great in magnitude, although they may have similar long lasting effects, as the 
2008-09 global financial crisis. 
An examination of daily movements in the S&P500 index back to 2000 suggests that large 
changes by historical standards are 4% in either direction. From January 2000 to August 
2008, there was a 0.31% chance of observing an increase of 4% or more in one day, and a 
0.18% chance of seeing a reduction of 4% or more in one day. Therefore, 99.5% of 
movements in the S&P500 index during this period had daily swings of less than 4%. Prior to 
September 2008, the S&P500 index had only 7 days with massive 4% gains, but since 
September 2008, there have been 18 more such days. On the downside, before the current 
stock market meltdown, the S&P500 index had only 4 days with huge 4% or more losses, 
whereas during the recent panic, there were a further 25 such days. As mentioned previously, 
the changes since the end of 2008 have been significant though less severe in magnitude. 
This comparison is between more than 99 months and a shorter period of 36 months. During 
this time span of the global financial crisis, the 4% or more gain days chances increased five 
times while the chances of 4% or more loss days multiplied by 18 times. Such movements in 
the S&P500 index are unprecedented. 
Alternative models of volatility can be compared on the basis of statistical significance, 
goodness of fit, forecasting VaR, calculation of daily capital charges, and optimality on a 
daily or temporally aggregated basis. As the focus of forecasting VaR is to calculate daily 
capital charges, subject to appropriate penalties, the most severe of which is temporary or 
permanent suspension from investment activities, the goodness of fit criterion used is the 
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calculation of daily and mean capital charges, both before and after the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis. 
 
 
5.  Forecasting VaR and Calculating Daily Capital Charges. 
In this section we conduct a hypothetical exercise to analyze the performance of existing 
state-of-the-art and the proposed risk management strategies, as permitted under the Basel II 
framework, when applied to the S&P500 Composite Index. Before doing so, we will discuss 
briefly the performance of the three major estimated models, namely GARCH(1,1), GJR(1,1) 
and EGARCH(1,1), for the full sample period. 
The GARCH(1,1) estimates under the three densities, namely Normal, Student t and 
Generalized Normal, in Table 4, are similar, with the ARCH (or alpha) effect being around 
0.8, and the GARCH (or beta) effect being around 0.91, such that the sum exceeds 0.99. 
Similar results are obtained for the asymmetric GJR(1,1) model in Table 5, with the 
asymmetry coefficient, gamma, being significant for all three densities, and with a similar 
order of magnitude. The estimates for EGARCH(1,1) are also similar across the three 
densities for the full sample period. 
  
[Insert Tables 4-5 here] 
 
The forecast values of VaR and daily capital charges are analysed before, during and after the 
2008-09 global financial crisis considering alternative risk management strategies. In Figure 
3, VaR forecasts are compared with S&P500 returns, where the vertical axis represents 
returns, and the horizontal axis represents the days from 2 January 2008 to 3 August 2012. 
The S&P500 Composite Index returns are given as the upper blue line that fluctuates around 
zero. 
ADIs need not restrict themselves to using only one of the available risk models. In this paper 
we propose a risk management strategy that consists in choosing from among different 
combinations of alternative risk models to forecast VaR. We first discuss a combination of 
models that can be characterized as an aggressive strategy and another that can be regarded as 
a conservative strategy, as given in Figure 3.
6
  
                                                 
6
 This is a novel possibility. Technically, a combination of forecast models is also a forecast model. In principle, 
the adoption of a combination of forecast models by an ADI to produce a combined forecast, is not forbidden by 
the Basel Accords, although it is subject to regulatory approval. 
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The upper red line represents the infinum of the VaR calculated for the individual models of 
volatility, which reflects an aggressive risk management strategy, whereas the lower green 
line represents the supremum of the VaR calculated for the individual models of volatility, 
which reflects a conservative risk management strategy. These two lines correspond to 
combinations of alternative risk models. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, VaR forecasts obtained from the different models of volatility 
have fluctuated, as expected, during the first few months of 2008. It has been relatively low, 
at below 5%, and relatively stable between April and August 2008.  Around September 2008, 
VaR started increasing until it peaked in October 2008, between 10% and 15%, depending on 
the model of volatility considered. This is essentially a four-fold increase in VaR in a matter 
of one and a half months.  In the last two months of 2008, VaR decreased to values between 
5% and 8%, which is still twice as large as it had been just a few months earlier. Therefore, 
volatility has increased substantially during the global financial crisis, and has remained 
relatively high after the crisis, especially during the European sovereign debt crisis from May 
2010. 
Figure 4 includes daily capital charges based on VaR forecasts and the mean VaR for the 
previous 60 days, which are the two lower thick lines. The red line corresponds to the 
aggressive risk management strategy based on the supremum of the daily VaR forecasts of 
the alternative models of volatility, and the green line corresponds to the conservative risk 
management strategy based on the infinum of the VaR forecasts of the alternative models of 
volatility
7
.  
Before the global financial crisis, there is a substantial difference between the two lines 
corresponding to the aggressive and conservative risk management strategies. However, at 
the onset of the global financial crisis, the two lines virtually coincide, which suggests that 
the averaged rolling window term in the Basel II formula, which typically dominates the 
calculation of daily capital charges, is excessive.  
After the global financial crisis had begun, there is a substantial difference between the two 
strategies, arising from divergence across the alternative models of volatility, and hence 
between the aggressive and conservative risk management strategies. 
                                                 
7
 Note that VaR figures are negative. 
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[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
It can be observed from Figure 4 that daily capital charges always exceed VaR (in absolute 
terms). Moreover, immediately after the global financial crisis had started, a significant 
amount of capital was set aside to cover likely financial losses. This is a positive feature of 
the Basel II Accord, since it can have the effect of shielding ADIs from possible significant 
financial losses.  
The Basel II Accord would seem to have succeeded in covering the market losses of ADIs 
before, during and after the global financial crisis for a portfolio that replicates S&P500. 
Therefore, it is likely to be useful when extended to countries to which it does not currently 
apply.  
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
Figure 5 shows the accumulated number of violations for three strategies over a period of 250 
days. Table 3 gives the percentage of days for which daily capital charges are minimized, the 
mean daily capital charges, the total number of violations, the normalized number of 
violation rate (that is, the ratio of NoV*250 to number of days) and the accumulated losses
8
 
(AcLoss) for the alternative models of volatility. The upper red line in Figure 5 corresponds 
to the aggressive risk management strategy, which yields a normalized number of violations 
of 10.24, thereby exceeding the limit of 10 in 250 working days. The lower green line 
corresponds to the conservative risk management strategy, which gives only 2.09. This small 
number of violations is well within the Basel II limits and will keep the ADIs in the green 
zone of Table 1, but may lead to higher daily capital charges. This conservative strategy may 
be optimal in our case, if one decides to stay in the green zone. 
It may be useful to consider other strategies that lie somewhat in the middle of the previous 
two, such as the DYLES strategy, developed in McAleer et al. (2010), which seems to work 
well in practice, or the median strategy, which was found to be optimal, in a different context, 
in McAleer et al. (2011). 
                                                 
8
 López (1999) suggested measuring the accuracy of the VaR forecast on the basis of the distance between the 
observed returns and the forecasted VaR values if a violation occurs:  
      



01 1 11 1
1
0
R VaR if R and R VaRt t tt t t t
t
otherwise
 , a preferred VaR model is the one that minimizes the total 
loss value, 1 1t
T
tt    . 
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It is also worth noting from Table 3 and Figure 6, which gives the duration of the minimum 
daily capital charges for three alternative models of volatility, that two models of risk, 
including the conservative risk management strategy, do not minimize daily capital charges 
for even one day. On the other hand, the aggressive risk management strategy minimizes the 
mean daily capital charge over the year relative to its competitors, and also has the second 
highest frequency of minimizing daily capital charges. The Riskmetrics and EGARCH model 
with t distribution errors also minimize daily capital charges frequently.  
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
In terms of choosing the appropriate risk model for minimizing DCC, the simulations results 
reported here would suggest the following: 
1) Before the global financial crisis from 3 January 2008 to 6 June 2008, the best model for 
minimizing daily capital charges is GARCH (coinciding with the Upperbound). For the 
period 6 June 2008 to 16 July 2008, GJR was best and, for only 5 days, EGARCH was 
the best. This is a period with relatively low volatility and few extreme values. 
2) Riskmetrics is the best model during the beginning of the crisis, from 16 July 2008 to 15 
September 2009. The S&P500 reached a peak on 12 August 2008, after which it started to 
decrease. In the second half of September 2008, the volatility on returns began to increase 
considerably. 
3) From 24 September 2008 to the end of 2009, the best model was EGARCH_T. This is a 
period with considerably high volatility and a large number of extreme values of returns. 
EGARCH can capture asymmetric volatility, thereby providing a more accurate measure 
of risk during large financial turbulence. 
4) During the rest of the sample, the Upperbound seems to be the strategy that minimizes the 
DCC most of the days, but not the only one. 
The global financial crisis has affected the best risk management strategies by changing the 
optimal model for minimizing daily capital charges. Here we proposed combinations of 
models to accommodate this situation. Our results suggest that some of these combinations 
might have provided adequate coverage against market risk of a portfolio that replicates 
S&P500, during the period 2008-09, which includes the global financial crisis.  
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6. Conclusion. 
Alternative risk models were found to be optimal in terms of minimizing daily capital charges 
before and during the global financial crisis. Volatility increased four-fold during the 2008-09 
global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis starting from May 2010, and 
remained relatively high after the crisis, as illustrated using the S&P500 Composite Index. As 
the risk model that optimizes daily capital charges has been changing during that period, this 
suggests that, as in time series, the forecasts of VaR could be improved using a combination 
of models rather than a single model. 
In this paper we proposed the idea of constructing risk management strategies that used 
combinations of several models for forecasting VaR. It was found that, in our case, an 
aggressive risk management strategy yielded the lowest mean capital charges, and had the 
highest frequency of minimizing daily capital charges throughout the forecasting period, but 
which also tended to violate too often. Such excessive violations can have the effect of 
leading to unwanted publicity, and temporary or permanent suspension from trading as an 
ADI. On the other hand, a conservative risk management strategy would have far fewer 
violations, and a correspondingly higher mean daily capital charges. This strategy will be the 
preferred one if the ADIs want to stay in the green zone of the Basel II Accord penalties.  
The area between the bounds provided by the aggressive and conservative risk management 
strategies would seem to be a fertile area for future research. A risk management strategy that 
used combinations of alternative risk models for predicting VaR and minimizing daily capital 
charges, namely the median, was found to be optimal in McAleer et al. (2012a, 2012b). A 
risk model that uses the DYLES strategy established in McAleer et al. (2010) may also be a 
useful risk management strategy.  
The recommended policy changes to practice by ADIs are straightforward as the methods 
suggested in this paper are practical, are simple to understand and implement, are easy to 
monitor and regulate, are leads to accurate forecasts, in general. 
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Table 1: Basel Accord Penalty Zones 
 
Zone Number of Violations k 
Green 0 to 4 0.00 
Yellow 5 0.40 
 6 0.50 
 7 0.65 
 8 0.75 
 9 0.85 
Red 10+ 1.00 
Note: The number of violations is given for 250 business days. 
The penalty structure under the Basel II Accord is specified for 
the number of violations and not their magnitude, either 
individually or cumulatively.   
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
 Descriptive Statistics for S&P500 Returns, 3 January 2000 – 03 August 2012 
 
0
200
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1,000
1,200
1,400
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Series: S&P500 Returns
Sample 3/01/2000 3/08/2012
Observations 3283
Mean      -0.000184
Median   0.017670
Maximum  10.95792
Minimum -9.469733
Std. Dev.   1.340072
Skewness  -0.154533
Kurtosis   10.57462
Jarque-Bera  7861.464
Probability  0.000000
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Table 3. 
For Alternative Models of Volatility, Percentage of Days Minimizing Daily Capital 
Charges (DCC), Mean Daily Capital Charges, Number of Violations (NoV), Normalized 
Number of Violations (NormNoV), and Accumultated Losses (AcLoss. 
 
MODEL 
% of days 
minimizing 
DCC 
Mean 
DCC 
NoV 
Norm. 
NoV 
AcLoss 
RSKM 18.4 % 12.10 31 6.48 21.30 
GARCH 1.0% 12.02 35 7.32 21.84 
GJR 3.0% 11.82 33 6.90 18.18 
EGARCH 11.7% 11.35 41 8.57 28.11 
GARCH_t 0.0% 12.97 10 2.09 7.60 
GJR_t 12.1% 12.38 14 2.93 8.08 
EGARCH_t 15.8% 11.76 17 3.55 11.23 
GARCH_g 5.9% 12.38 21 4.39 13.58 
GJR_g 9.3% 11.45 20 4.18 12.67 
EGARCH_g 6.2% 11.75 27 5.64 19.09 
Lowerbound 0.0% 13.43 10 2.09 5.88 
Upperbound 16.7% 11.14 49 10.24 33.29 
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Table 4  
GARCH(1,1) Estimates. 
 
Density Parameter All Std. Error 
Normal 
  
0.083** 0.0068 
  
0.909** 0.0072 
  +   
0.992  
 
Density Parameter All Std. Error 
Student-
t 
(6.85) 
  
0.083** 0.0098 
  
0.914** 0.0093 
  +   
0.998  
 
Density Parameter All  Std. Error 
Generalized 
Normal 
  
0.083** 0.0105 
  
0.913** 0.0105 
  +   
0.996  
 
Notes:  All denotes the full sample period. The entries in  
parentheses for the Student-t distribution are the estimated  
degrees of freedom.  
** These estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 
GJR(1,1) Estimates. 
 
Density Parameter All Std-error 
Normal 
  
-0.024** 0.0054 
  
0.152** 0.0102 
  
0.9366** 0.0059 
 +  + /2 
0.989  
 
Density Parameter All  Std-error 
Student-t 
(8.37) 
  
-0.027** 0.0075 
  
0.154** 0.0138 
  
0.940** 0.0070 
 +  +  /2 
0.990  
 
Density Parameter All Std-error 
Generalized 
Normal 
  -0.026** 0.0081 
  0.153** 0.0147 
  0.938** 0.0080 
 +  +  /2 0.989  
 
Notes:  All denotes the full sample period. The entries in  
parentheses for the Student-t distribution are the estimated  
degrees of freedom.  
** These estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6 
EGARCH(1,1) Estimates. 
Density Parameter All Std-error 
Normal 
  
0.101** 0.0107 
  
-0.123** 0.0078 
  
0.982** 0.0017 
 
Density Parameter All  
Std-
error 
Student-
t 
(7.72) 
  0.096** 0.0139 
  -0.129** 0.0108 
  0.987** 0.0021 
 
Density Parameter All Before 
Generalized 
Normal 
  0.101** 0.0156 
  -0.128** 0.0114 
  0.986** 0.0024 
 
Notes:  All denotes the full sample period. The entries in  
parentheses for the Student-t distribution are the estimated  
degrees of freedom.  
** These estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1. 
Daily Returns on the S&P500 Index, 3 January 2000 – 3 August 2012. 
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Figure 2. 
Daily Volatility in S&P500 Returns, 3 January 2000 – 3 August 2012. 
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Figure 3. 
 VaR for S&P500 Returns, 2 January 2008 – 3 August 2012. 
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Note:  The upper blue line graphs the daily returns for the S&P500 index. The upper red line 
graphs the infinum of the VaR forecasts for the different models described in Section 3. The 
lower green line corresponds to the supremum of the forecasts of the VaR for the same 
models. 
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Figure 4. 
VaR and Mean VaR for the Previous 60 Days to Calculate Daily Capital Charges for 
S&P500 Returns, 3 January 2008- 3 August 2012. 
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Figure 5.  
Number of Violations Accumulated Over 250 Days, 3 January 2008- 3 August 2012. 
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Figure 6.  
Duration of Minimum Daily Capital Charges for Alternative Models of Volatility,  
3 January 2008- 3 August 2012. 
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Note: The value of one on the vertical axis means that the model minimizes DCC in 
that day. 
 
